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VICO, LLEWELLYN, AND THE TASK OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION 
Francis J. Mootz, III 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How does legal education fail students? This question invites a book, 
but this Article focuses on a particular pedagogical deficiency. Put simply, 
legal education is too text-bound, and it approaches texts in a manner that is 
far too circumscribed and simplistic. This Article argues that legal 
education suppresses law's rhetorical roots and that this failure leaves 
students unprepared for the rhetorical demands of legal practice. Students 
do not learn that legal texts are rhetorical instruments, nor do they learn that 
legal rhetoric encompasses more than just textual expression. Legal 
education fails students because it is insufficiently rhetorical. This Article 
draws inspiration from an oration delivered by Giambattista Vico three 
hundred years ago and from an aside in a short, provocative essay published 
seventy-five years ago by Karl Llewellyn. In the wake of the recent 
Carnegie Report on the legal profession and legal education, the time is ripe 
to renew the unheeded calls by Vico and Llewellyn for a legal education 
that is rhetorical in nature. 
II. LA W'S NEGLECT OF RHETORIC 
Law is a specialized rhetorical discourse, but lawyers tend not to 
understand the full depth of this reality. Too many lawyers regard law as a 
system of "given" narratives operating within a rigid semiotic economy, 
failing to recognize that law is a dynamic system that is constantly under 
construction. This failure is explained partly by their desire for law to be 
real, objective, and enduring. An unfortunate result of this desire is that 
lawyers too readily resign themselves to making only technical 
interventions and engaging in instrumentalist strategies, parroting bits of the 
dominant narratives in response to certain discrete problems. This approach 
often is sufficient to permit them to achieve their clients' objectives, and so 
these instrumental efforts pay very well. Well-paid lawyers tend not to ask 
too many questions. Consequently, the law's rhetorical dimension is, at 
best, misunderstood by lawyers who equate it with showmanship and 
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stylistic flourish; more likely is that rhetoric is wholly ignored. 
Why do lawyers understand their practice in such a shallow manner, 
and how can legal education correct this inadequacy? By framing the 
question we already find a general, initial answer. Most lawyers would 
regard rhetorical theory as an exotic discipline that has no relevance to the 
real world of lawyering. And, if fancy rhetorical theory is unable to help 
win a case or to succeed in a negotiation, lawyers will see little benefit to 
learning about what appears to be merely an academic dalliance. It makes 
no sense to challenge shallow self-understanding with sophisticated 
academic theories when the practice at hand appears not to require 
theoretical guidance. 
There are two general responses to this anti-intellectualism. First, one 
might argue that lawyers will become better lawyers if they understand 
rhetoric, even if there is no rhetorical methodology that can be studied, 
memorized, and then applied in legal practice. Second, one might claim 
that the lawyer's avowed instrumentalism is the very problem to be 
addressed and then suggest that the insights of rhetorical theory can assist 
one in understanding why lawyers suffer from this malady. The first 
response tends to affirm the instrumental and reductivist approach to law, 
which is the principal problem; therefore, it threatens to undermine the 
possibility for the second response. This Article principally addresses the 
second point, but also suggests that this critical approach indirectly sheds 
light on how law professors might improve legal education to educate more 
effective lawyers, once they have broadened their notion of effectiveness 
beyond instrumentalism. 
III. VICO'S INGENIOUS METHOD OF RHETORICAL 
EDUCATION 
Giambattista Vico was a "professor of rhetoric in eighteenth-century 
Naples" and "is customarily regarded as the most original thinker in the 
Italian philosophical tradition ."1 Vico's most famous oration was delivered 
at the commencement of the academic year at the University of Naples in 
1708 and published the following year. The scope of On the Study Methods 
of Our Time2 is breathtaking: with the Cartesian "critical method" rapidly 
gaining ascendance in intellectual circles, Vico argued on behalf of the 
humanistic tradition in a manner that was neither ill-informed nor atavistic. 
He fully appreciated the power of the Cartesian method, but he also 
I. DA YID L. MARSHALL, VJCO AND THE TRANSFORMA TJON OF RHETORIC IN EARLY 
MODERN EUROPE I (20 I 0). 
2. GIAMBATTISTA v,co, ON THE STUDY METHODS OF OUR TIME (Elio Gianturco trans ., 
Cornell Univ. Press 1990) (1709) [hereinafter STUDY METHODS). 
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anticipated that its power would prove to be overbearing, extending beyond 
its narrow range of proper application. He conceded that one must embrace 
the new rationalism, but that one should do so only without sacrificing 
ancient wisdom. 3 Vico's lament was not that lawyers have abandoned a 
glorious intellectual past, but that they have failed to fulfill the intellectual 
promise of the future . It is no overstatement to say that, at the dawn of the 
modem rationalist era, Vico foresaw that lawyers would lose their ingenuity 
and become technocrats managed by legal narratives instead of .exercising 
their rhetorical roles as managers of meaning. 
Vico began his oration with a reminder that all human knowledge is 
partial and fallible, and that every person must always be ready to assess 
one's beliefs and to correct them. 4 However, he exhorted his audience to 
recognize that Cartesian radical doubt undermines not only false beliefs that 
should be discarded, but also beliefs grounded in the probable, without 
which no one could live. 5 The critical method undermines the cultivation of 
common sense, which subtends both practical judgment and eloquence, 
thereby restricting knowledge to an arid and abstract intellectualism. 6 It is 
important to stress that Vico did not seek to abandon the Cartesian method 
in favor of a return to ancient rhetoric. Instead, he counseled a prudent 
understanding of the role that each can play: "a severely intellectualistic 
criticism enables us to achieve truth, while ars topica makes us eloquent," 7 
concluding "[ e Jach procedure, then has its defects. The specialists in topics 
fall in with falsehood; the philosophical critics disdain any traffic with 
probability. "8 
Vico argued that relentless criticism leaves no room for the rhetorical 
arts, but it is only in rhetorical engagement that one can deal with questions 
that admit of no definitive answer. The law purports to seek certainty, but 
when this goal is understood to mean "truth" in the sense of the Cartesian 
method it becomes a debilitating straitjacket for legal practice. 
3. As described by Elio Ginaturco, 
[Vico J sets the seal of a philosophical conclusion upon the Quarrel of the Ancients and the 
Modems. Vico draws , so to speak, the final balance-sheet of the great controversy; not only 
that, but transposes it to a ground where the problem posited can receive a solution. He is a 
reconciler of the two factions ; he lifts their debate to a high philosophical plane, he rises to 
the concept of a modem culture harmonizing the scientific with the humani stic aspects of 
education. 
Elio Ginaturco , Translator's Introduction to STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at xxiii-xxiv. 
4 . STUDY M ETHODS, supra note 2, at 1-12 . 
5. Indeed , if a per son were to try to live life by utilizing only Cartesian reasoning she would 
be incapable of action and most likely would be regarded as having a serious mental disturb ance. 
6 . STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 13 . 
7. Id. at 17. 
8. Id. at 19. 
138 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 57 
Nature and life are full of incertitude; the foremost, indeed, the only 
aim of our [rhetorical] "arts" is to assure us that we have acted 
rightly .... Those who know all the loci, i.e., the lines of argument to 
be used, are able (by an operation not unlike reading the printed 
characters on a page) to grasp extemporaneously the elements of 
persuasion inherent in any question or case .... In pressing, urgent 
affairs, which do not admit of delay or postponement, as most 
frequently occurs in our law courts . .. it is the orator's business to 
give immediate assistance .... Our experts in philosophical criticism, 
instead, whenever they are confronted with some dubious point, are 
wont to say: "Give me some time to think it over!"9 
Rhetoric is unavoidable just because life is uncertain . The Cartesian 
philosopher vainly seeks to determine the truth of the matter and therefore 
is impotent when faced with a choice between two proposed courses of 
action that are equally valid from a logical perspective. In contrast, one 
who is capable of determining the relevant arguments "for and against" the 
proposed action on the basis of the probabilities of the given circumstances, 
and is then able to persuade others as to the best approach, exhibits a 
wisdom that is far superior for this task than the more limited scope of 
definitive truth. 
Vico provocatively compared the ability to "grasp extemporaneously" 
the lines of argument to "reading the printed characters on a page." 
Lawyers speak colloquially about "reading a situation," but Vico urged us 
to take this metaphor to a deeper level. The abstract characters that form a 
written language are capable of generating an infinite number of 
expressions as speakers combine them in new and inventive ways over 
time. Reading social situations is not an unmediated perceptual facility to 
recognize brute facts; rather, it is an art that develops over time as one 
develops familiarity with the commonplaces that can be deployed in 
creative ways. An education in eloquence is an education in arraying lines 
of argument inventively to respond to the situation , and this art rests on 
ingenuity in "seeing" which arguments best match the situation. The sage 
understands that this capacity is distinct from philosophical criticism, and is 
not so foolish as to "apply to the prudent conduct of life the abstract 
criterion of reasoning that obtains in the domain of science." 10 
Vico insisted that the art of making arguments through an inventive 
use of commonplaces "is by nature prior to the judgment of their validity," 
and so the art of rhetoric should be granted priority over critical analysis 
9. STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 15 . 
10. Id. at 35. 
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rather than being suppressed. 11 One must first locate the means of 
persuasion within a given situation before it is even possible to test the 
reasoning with philosophical criticism. Even more importantly, not all 
prudential decisions can or should be subjected to second-guessing by the 
philosopher. Many of life's issues simply are not amenable to 
philosophical analysis in the Cartesian tradition; instead, they call for 
mature judgment that Vico identified with the ancient rhetorical tradition. 
There are three humanistic capabilities that Vico championed, despite the 
vigorous Cartesian criticism that their uncertain bases introduces the 
possibility of error : (I) the ingenuity of finding similarities among 
seemingly different factors; (2) the imaginative capacity to create a new 
understanding of reality; and (3) the prudence to choose appropriately when 
the matter is not subject to calculation . The sage must not only be 
committed to truth, but also be ready to act when the frailties of the human 
condition preclude an analysis that demonstrates the truth of the matter. 
The sage, 
through all the obliquities and uncertainties of human actions and 
events, keeps his eye steadily focused on eternal truth, manages to 
follow a roundabout way whenever he cannot travel in a straight line, 
and makes decisions, in the field of action, which, in the course of 
time, prove to be as profitable as the nature of things permits.12 
These considerations lead directly to Vico's recommendations for 
organizing education. Building on the oration delivered in the previous 
year, 13 Vico insisted that students must first develop their rhetorical skills 
before being introduced to philosophical criticism . Vico feared that the 
student might lose forever the capacity for ingenuity, imagination, and 
eloquence if exposed to the abstract intellectualism of the Cartesian method 
without first cultivating the humanistic arts. In a detailed discussion of law 
and legal education, Vico brought his thesis to bear in very concrete ways. 
He recounted the emergence of law as a distinct discipline . The Greeks 
regarded law as a site of the activity of conjoining philosophy and oratorical 
skills. 14 Similarly, the Romans strictly maintained written laws, but utilized 
legal fictions that were generated by the orator to avoid injustice. 15 By 
Vico's time, though, the law had expanded beyond the stark written text 
and enveloped within itself the moderating force of equity as a matter of 
11. STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 14. 
12. Id. at 35 . 
13. GIAMBAITISTA VICO, On the Proper Order of Studies, in ON HUMANISTIC EDUCATION 
(SIX INAUGURAL ORATIONS, 1699-1707) 123, 125-40 (Giorgio A. Pinton & Arthur W. Shippee 
trans., 1993). 
14. STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 49 . 
15. Id. at 50-52. 
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interpretation rather than of eloquence. 16 
The law now claims the mantel of justice, which represents both a 
positive development and a loss; although the law had become directly 
equitable, Vico argued that the connection between law and eloquence-
understood as wisdom speaking appropriately to the given situation-had 
become obscured. Vico regarded it as a clear advantage that "the 
professions of legal expert and orator are, in our age, joined in the same 
person," 17 but as justice was absorbed into law it became too easy for 
private parties to manipulate the levers of legal authority for their own gain 
without any check or limit. It was this decay of eloquence in favor of the 
pursuit of self-interest, Vico emphasizes, that sealed Rome's fate.18 The 
law had become a self-sufficient discourse that was susceptible to technical 
manipulation because there is no external discourse to which it must answer 
through rhetorical argumentation. The problem facing eighteenth-century 
European society, he believed, was the need to bring legal doctrine back 
into contact with eloquence and practical wisdom. 19 
One might wonder if Vico's reference to law and legal education in 
the oration is wholly happenstance, such that the musings of this 
eighteenth-century rhetorician might appear to have no intrinsic connection 
to law. In fact, Vico was educated in law, sought a Chair on the law 
faculty, wrote one of his early works on law, and rooted his thinking in 
legal reasoning and eloquence.20 Donald Kelley's reading of Vico leads 
him to suggest that the modem "social and cultural sciences seem to be the 
ghosts of dead jurisprudences" 21 as capaciously understood by Vico, and it 
was jurisprudence as a "human system of moral, social, and political 
thought . . . rather than the tradition of Greek, scholastic, or Cartesian 
metaphysics that provided Vico with his principal model and central 
ideas."22 In a similar assessment, Michael Mooney emphasizes that Vico's 
conception of "rhetoric" was "not a literary but judicial rhetoric-rhetoric 
16. STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 59 . 
17. Id. at 62 . 
18. Id. at 69. 
19. Id. at 69-70. 
20. A succinct biography of Vico is provided in PA TRICIA BIZZELL & BRUCE HERZBERG, THE 
RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 862-64 (200 l ). 
21. Donald R. Kelley, In Vico Veritas: The True Philosophy and the New Science , 43 Soc . 
RES. 601,611 (1976). 
22 . Donald R. Kelley, Vico 's Road: From Philology to Jurisprudence and Back, in 
GIAMBATTISTA VICO'S SCIENCE OF HUMANITY 15, 27 (Girogio Tagliacozzo & Donald Phillip 
Verene eds., 1976). Kelley concludes that the "debts owed by Vico to jurisprudence are 
incalculable and in some cases almost indemonstrable .. . for they involve matters not only of 
content but of form and method , not only exempla but, much more significantly , also principia of 
human behavior." Id. at 19. 
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as argumentation, a process of reasoning," and that his New Science was 
premised on the belief that the principles of argumentative discourse 
provide access to the origin of humanity and undermine the intellectualist 
fantasy expressed by the Cartesian critical method.23 Law is not just an 
example of one practice among many for Vico. Law is the practice in 
which one's civic life is born and renewed, and it is of central importance to 
Vico's philosophy. 24 
Vico's oration speaks directly to the question that motivates this 
Article. A technocratic approach to law and legal education suppresses the 
imagination and intellectual virtues necessary to practice law in a manner 
that genuinely unites eloquence-which Vico defines as "wisdom, ornately 
and copiously delivered in words appropriate to the common opinion of 
mankind" 25 -with the re-fashioning of legal doctrine to address the case at 
hand. Legal hermeneutics has supplanted rhetoric, but many contemporary 
theorists remain ignorant of the rhetorical core of legal hermeneutics. 
Consequently, we find legal hermeneutics devolving into a deductive-
empirical exercise of identifying the "original meaning" intended by the 
drafters or the "plain meaning" of the legal text. The law now includes 
justice within its scope, but a methodological hermeneutics that seeks 
certainty in the application of the law suppresses this dimension of legality. 
As a result, lawyers devolve into the mouthpieces of a voiceless wisdom 
that are equipped only to manipulate legal formulae. 
Vico's "ingenious method"-studying topics and learning how to 
persuade others in a situation of uncertainty-is a recommendation to use 
one's common sense to imagine new solutions to problems, to "see" a new 
path of persuasion by drawing connections that are not already recognized. 
A well-chosen metaphor does just that. It carries a meaning from one 
situation to a new situation, seemingly instantaneously, as if one suddenly 
sees something that previously had been hidden from view.26 
The ingenious faculty assumes the important function of supplying 
arguments which the rational process itself is not capable of 
"finding" . . . . But it is exclusively on the basis of revealing common 
23. MICHAEL MOONEY, VICO IN THE TRADITION OF RHETORIC, at xiii, 82-83 (1985). 
24. For discussions on the centrality of law to Vico's thinking , see Francis J. Mootz , III, 
Recalling Vico 's Lament: The Role of Prudence and Rhetoric in Law and Legal Education, 83 
CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 1097 (2008). 
25 . STUDY METHODS, supra note 2, at 78. 
26 . The original meaning of "metaphor" was to physically carry an item from one place to 
another, but gradually it came to be used "metaphorically " as a transfer of meaning that Aristotle 
recognized as being foundational to education because it generated knowledge not through a chain 
of deductions that might fail but rather through immediate insight. ERNESTO GRASSI, RHETORJC 
AS PHILOSOPHY 94-95 ( 1980). 
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elements that a transfer can be made, and that is why Vico defines the 
ingenious faculty as a requisite for metaphorical thought. ... Based on 
the ingenious faculty, which establishes relationships or common 
factors, imagination, according to Vico, confers meanings on sense 
perceptions. Through its transfers, imagination is the original faculty 
of "letting see" (phainestai), so that Vico calls it "the eye of the 
. . ,,27 
mgemum. 
It is necessary to exercise the imagination through topical 
argumentation because there is no substitute for the accumulation of 
experience. One cannot become prudent by declaring answers to practical 
problems by means of deduction; one becomes prudent through the exercise 
of judgment based on "insight," which is really a "new sight" or a "broader 
view." To express this metaphorically , consider how it is possible to 
improve one's eyesight by using one's eye in a certain manner-such as 
using a patch on one eye to force the other eye to focus properly-but one 
can be sure that reading about the biological structure of one's optical 
sensations will not improve this capacity. Vico urged his contemporaries to 
recognize the fact that the ingenious capacity of students can be improved 
through proper education-an education in the liberal arts.28 Rhetorical 
education is a matter of gaining experience by exercising one's rhetorical 
capabilities, rather than through cognitive achievement. 
Vico's oration relates to law directly and not just superficially . Seen 
27. Ernesto Grassi, The Priority of Common Sense and the Imagination: Vico 's Philosophical 
Relevanc e Today, 43 Soc. RES. 553, 562 (1976) (quoting De antiquissima Jtalorum spaientia, in 
Opere I : 184-185). 
28. Michael Mooney makes this point vividly: 
Ingenuity, Vico says repeatedly, is the "faculty of bringing together things that are disparate 
and widely separated." It lays no claim to thoroughness or method, but is a capacity, as 
Petrarch had said of it, which is quick and decisive, penetrating and acute, ready and 
adaptive. One does not need to call on ingenuity; one either has it or does not, sees 
connections or misses them utterly. Vico was a child of acute ingenuity, he claimed, and so, 
too, are children generally, if only we will recognize it and train them accordingly. For 
ingenuity depends on the images of fantasy, a faculty most vivid and robust in youth, and on 
the power of memory, fantasy's twin, and they in tum take their start in sensations, the 
images of sense. But the point is more subtle than it seems, for sense and memory are not to 
be thought of as mere passive capacities , receiving and retaining impressions that 
imagination and ingenuity subsequently work through; sense, memory, imagination, and 
ingenuity are four virtually indistinguishable aspects of the single, prediscursive action of the 
mind. 
. . . Ingenious perception is truly an invention, an assembling and arranging of images 
that produces a genuinely novel vision .... [In) oratory and law, it is a vision of how things 
should be, a course of action that will set things right or avoid their deterioration, a vision 
that joins past to future through current expectations, thus achieving plausibility, but one that 
does so through images that are familiar and foreign alike, thus opening to us new ways. 
Such images are those of metaphor, language that is sententious and acute. 
MOONEY, supra note 23, at 151, 153. 
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within the context of his life's work, the oration is premised on a view of 
knowledge and human understanding that confronts the Cartesian critical 
approach at the deepest philosophical levels rather than merely suggesting 
that different educational methodologies might be employed . Vico's 
ingenious method-training students in the art of argumentation-develops 
the capacity of their imagination to see the world in new ways . This is not 
just training students to learn rhetorical tricks that can be mastered and then 
packed into the lawyer's toolkit for later use. Instead, Vico's educational 
program was designed to facilitate the student's ability to enter and move 
about a semiotic realm by exercising their rhetorical competencies. 
Contemporary lawyers are particularly in need of such an education because 
they must negotiate the symbolic order of law through rhetorical 
engagement with others, a situation that became all too apparent in 
twentieth-century America. 
IV. LLEWELLYN'S REALIST ACCOUNT OF THE RHETORICAL 
DIMENSION OF LAW 
In the manner of Vico's oration, Karl Llewellyn famously addressed 
the entering students at Columbia Law School in the 1920s with a lecture 
meant to inspire as much as to orient. Llewellyn urged the students to 
immerse themselves in law, not for the purpose of losing themselves to a 
technical discipline, but to enable them to recognize that law addresses the 
entire "drama of society" so that they would embrace the unity of 
profession, culture , and society. 29 A short time later, exactly 225 years after 
Vico's address, Llewellyn suggested-in what appears to be a throwaway 
footnote, exhibiting his customary florid prose-that he was principally 
concerned with uncovering the rhetorical nature of legal encounter with 
social drama. 
I still feel my wattles grow red as I recall the shock with which, as a 
dyed-in-the-wool commercial lawyer, I met property phases of 
mortgage law which left me gasping. "One system of precedent" we 
may have, but it works in forty different ways. Some day, someone 
will help the second year student orient himself. Nor does anyone 
bother to present to him the difference between logic and persuasion, 
nor what a man facing old courts is to do with a new vocabulary; in a 
word, the game, in framing an argument, of diagnosing the peculiar 
presuppositions of the hearers . I think the second year student is 
entitled to feel himself aggrieved. Meanwhile, while we wait upon the 
treading of the Angel, there is rushing in that calls for doing. Here is a 
29. K.N. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH, 141-44, 152-53 (1930). 
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Llewellyn's wntmgs on legal education illuminate his understanding of 
legal rhetoric. 
The following year, Llewellyn issued a testy call for a dramatic 
reorganization of legal education in response to the insights generated by 
legal realism? Deriding the Langdellian model because "it blinds, it 
stumbles, it conveyor-belts, it wastes, it mutilates, and it empties[,]" 32 
Llewellyn argued that legal education must prepare students to lead a full 
and enriching professional life by educating them about the social context 
in which law operates rather than just teaching abstract rules.33 Students 
must understand legal rules in context if lawyering is to be something other 
than algebraic manipulations divorced from the real-world effects of the 
legal system, and it is precisely by understanding rules in context that one 
recognizes their contingency and develops a critical perspective: "You 
make critique inevitable, because the human content, once introduced, will 
never be denied." 34 Llewellyn insisted that lawyers must have a liberal 
education if they are to bring such critical insight to bear in legal practice. 
At the end of his career, Llewellyn still was calling for the study of law as a 
liberal art, grounded in a combination of technical proficiency and broader 
l . 35 earnmg. 
The aim of Llewellyn's "liberal education" is properly understood as 
rhetorical competence. When he supplemented his Columbia orientation 
30. Karl N. Llewellyn , On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205 , 205 n.* 
(1934). 
31. See generally K.N . Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education , 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1935) [hereinafter So-Called Legal Education]. 
32. Id. at 653. His conclusion is phrased in equally harsh terms : "Law school education, even 
in the best schools , is, then , so inadequate, wasteful, blind and foul that it will take twenty years of 
unremitting effort to make it half-way equal to its job ." Id. at 678. 
33. Id. at 668-71. 
34. Id. at 669 . 
35. Karl N . Llewellyn, The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, Lecture (Delivered in 1960), in 
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 375-94 (1962) [hereinafter Liberal Art]. 
Llewellyn challenged the growing belief that preparing students to practice law was inconsistent 
with the research ideals of the university: 
The truth, the truth which cries out, is that the good work, the most effective work, of the 
lawyer in practice roots in and depends on vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanity-
those things which it is the function, and frequently the fortune, of the liberal arts to 
introduce and indeed to induce. The truth is therefore that the best practical training a 
University can give to any lawyer who is not by choice or unendowment doomed to be hack 
or shyster-the best practical training, along with the best human training, is the study of 
law, within the professional school itself, as a liberal art. 
Id. at 3 76. Llewellyn also repeated his frequent insistence that law students read broadly and 
deeply to acquaint themselves with the context in which law operates . Id. at 388-89 . 
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lectures twenty years later, Llewellyn focused on the need to bridge the 
practice-theory divide. He emphasized that the craft of law "cries out for 
the development and teaching of its theory, as it does also for study by 
doing in the light of that theory." 36 He named this needed approach 
"Spokesmanship," deriving it from the theories first developed in ancient 
Greece as "Rhetoric-in essence: the effective techniques of persuasion.'' 37 
Too often, Llewellyn argued, Spokesmanship has been cast too narrowly as 
the ability to add ornament to legal argument as part of advocacy. 
But "Spokesmanship" has come to be for me a more significant focus 
than any of the above, including and profiting from the essence of each 
of them while also reaching out to cover such matters as the values of 
having buffers between contending principals or the differences 
between the rival goals of victory and reconciliation or the problems 
and obligations of leadership both in the small and in the large. In a 
word, Spokesmanship with special attention to work on the legal side 
seems to me to offer the wherewithal of a full-fledged theoretical-
practical discipline with cultural value equal to its professional 
value .. .. 38 
Spokesmanship is a rhetorical practice with both theoretical and practical 
dimensions that can equip lawyers for the challenges of their profession. 
Llewellyn's conception of legal rhetoric was central to his realist 
philosophy, although some critics badly misread him as an ivory-tower 
relativist who believed in law's absolute indeterminacy. 39 In fact, 
Llewellyn found ample stability within the practice of law while at the same 
time acknowledging room for critique and reform. 40 Llewellyn wrote that 
the totality of the practice of law was one of the most "conservative and 
inflexible" of social phenomena, and yet every case offered the opportunity 
36. LLEWELLYN, supra note 29, at 185. 
37. Id. Llewellyn explains : 
There is a theory of advocacy, or spokesmanship, or rhetoric (which aspect lends the name is 
immaterial}--a theory which has formed the basis of a liberal art since classic times; a 
theory, moreover, which is empty and vain save as it builds on and with deep understanding 
of the psychological and ethical nature of cause or of client, of tribunal or other addressee, of 
society and of the law-governmental phase thereof. 
Liberal Art , supra note 35 , at 382 . 
38. LLEWELLYN, supra note 29, at 186. This is his vision of a legal education in the tradition 
of the liberal arts : attending to the rhetoric of lawyering in its broadest sense. Liberal Art, supra 
note 36, at 389. 
39. Admittedly, Llewellyn provided enough ammunition to his critics. See KARL 
LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LA w SYSTEM IN AMER1CA 80 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans ., 
Univ . of Chicago Press 1989) (originally published as Priijudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in 
Amerika (1933) , based on lectures delivered in Germany in 1928-29) [hereinafter CASE LAW 
SYSTEM]. 
40 . Dennis Patterson , Law 's Practice, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 575 , 580-81 , 598-99 (1990) . 
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for the judge and lawyers to shift the direction of thinking .41 Llewellyn 
anticipated the central tenet of contemporary legal hermeneutics by arguing 
that the meaning of a legal rule is known only in its use and that using a rule 
is always a reformulation of the rule ( either by expansion or contraction), 
even when the case feels like a simple matter of deductive reasoning. 
Thus, the task of the judge is to reformulate the rule so that from then 
on the rule undoubtedly includes the case or undoubtedly excludes it. 
"To apply the rule" is thus a misnomer; rather, one expands a rule or 
contracts it. One can only "apply" a rule after first freely choosing 
either to include the instant case within it or to exclude the case from 
it. ... 
Matters are no different, only more sharply highlighted, when a 
new case is such that one first must mull over whether to include it 
within an existing category, or must choose which existing category to 
include it in .... 
For we all, lawyer not least, are mistaken about the nature of 
language. We regard language as if words were things with fixed 
content. Precisely because we apply to a new fact situation a well-
known and familiar linguistic symbol, we lose the feeling of newness 
about the case; it seems long familiar to us. The word hides its 
changed meaning from the speaker.42 
His message was philosophically radical, but he was no linguistic skeptic, 
cultural nihilist, or political revolutionary. Llewellyn firmly believed that 
lawyers qm and should be educated to move within the rhetorically-rich 
narratives of law. 
V. EDUCATING LAWYERS WITH INGENUITY AND 
RHETORICAL SENSIBILITY 
Drawing from Vico's oration and Llewellyn's legal philosophy one 
can fashion a productive lens through which to view the rhetorical 
dimensions of law and the resulting implications for legal education. Vico 
wrote at a momentous time in the intellectual history of the West, and he 
spoke with the conviction that his lessons were not effete academic theories 
but instead concerned the possibility for the continued development of 
Western culture. Scholars of his New Science 43 might debate whether Vico 
was a historical determinist, but there can be no mistake that he believed 
41. CASE LAW SYSTEM, supra note 39, at I 1-12 . 
42. Id. at 74- 75. 
43 . G!AMBAITISTA VICO, THE NEW SCIENCE (Thomas G. Bergin & Max H. Fisch trans. , rev . 
unabridged ed ., Cornell Univ . Press I 968) (I 744). 
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firmly in the efficacy of human agency when he delivered On the Study 
Methods of Our Time. 44 Llewellyn also wrote at a momentous intellectual 
moment, when the juridical forces of modernity had solidified an abstract 
and formal approach to jurisprudence, and the nascent tremors of 
postmodern thinking had just begun. In periods of great intellectual crisis 
both thinkers displayed a sense of pragmatic urgency, working from deep 
philosophical insight but remaining rooted in practical questions of 
pedagogy. 
Vico provides an ontology of legal rhetoric-an understanding of how 
lawyers see the world and construct the worlct45 -that simultaneously 
recognizes human agency and rejects the hubristic claims of Enlightenment 
reason. Vico regards the creative insight of the rhetor as an important factor 
in the ongoing elevation of man out of nature, but he does not endorse a 
crude humanist account of subjective agency that assumes that individuals 
can rise above their cultural context and survey it as a geographer might. 
He recognizes that persons exist in and through rhetorically-constructed 
44 . STUDY METHODS , supra note 2. I concur with Mark Lilla that the New Science can be 
read as continuous with Vico's earlier oration. 
If civilized Athens and mighty Rome were both undone by the "barbarism of 
reflection," is there any hope of nations today escaping their fate? ... In his pre-scientific 
works Vico's practical political teaching is clear enough: preserve the traditions and religious 
customs by which divine providence directs you to the verum, forswearing the enticements of 
modem enlightenment, and you shall be like Rome. But those earlier works treat only of 
Rome's exemplary rise, ignoring her fall. 
By studying the collapse of Rome at the end of her historical corso he now hopes to 
unmask the forces that robbed her of those traditional strengths. Those lessons could then be 
applied to European societies through the ricorso, which puts Europe in Rome's place and 
reveals which of its "Roman" traditions must be defended against the new barbarization. 
On this reading, the corso-ricorso doctrine is not a scientific doctrine. It is a prophecy, 
a dramatic warning to modem Europe that she stands at the edge of an abyss. No reader has 
come away from the final packed pages of the New Science without sensing their prophetic 
rhetorical power. Just as in On Method, where he once called modem Europeans to revive 
ancient education, Vico again seems to be calling Europe away from its modernity . 
. . . His practical teaching is therefore relatively clear: societies wishing to maintain 
their perfection must learn to strengthen all that is Roman within themselves, and direct all 
that is Greek within them to serve these Roman virtues. Philosophy can retain a role in 
maintaining this equilibrium, though only as the handmaiden of science and religion. 
Philosophy must now choose to assist "common sense" rather than weaken it through 
skepticism. 
MARK LILLA, G.B. Vrco: THE MAKING OF AN ANTI-MODERN 217, 225-27 (1993). 
45. I certainly do not propose to resuscitate Vico's ontology as he conceived it, which was 
embedded within a religious cosmology that no longer holds sway. See Willem Witteveen , 
Reading Vico for the School of Law , 83 CH!.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2008). My reading is in 
the spirit suggested by Witteveen: "[I]t is impossible to draw lessons from the letter of the work; 
we should rather look for its spirit, manifesting itself at the level of metaphor. ... Literalism in 
interpreting a classic text is often the best way of misrepresenting the views of its author." Id. 
This is just to say that I read Vico as a legal theorist rather than approaching him historically in an 
effort to capture his worldview. 
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narratives and that there is no human subject capable of willing meaning 
into existence. Even while warning against the hubris of seeking 
knowledge of things divine in an effort to become wholly self-directing, 
Vico insisted that one is capable of achieving knowledge of human affairs 
and shaping them. In short, Vico propounded a rhetorical philosophy that is 
closely tied to civic and political engagement, and by returning to Vico one 
finds a starting point from which he may embark on a path that avoids the 
Charybdis of "just playing" and the Scylla of endless self-consuming 
deconstruction. 
Vico's use of the metaphor of sight to describe rhetorical knowledge is 
an illuminating trope for thinking about educating lawyers with rhetorical 
sensibility. The goal of legal education should not be to instill knowledge 
of legal rules or even to teach students how to "think like a lawyer." 
Rather, legal education should be a formative experience through which 
students come to inhabit a new world where they move about as one moves 
about in a physical place. The ancient topics, loci communes, operated 
literally as "common-places" in which a community resided and within 
which members exhibited a "common sense." 46 It is important not to 
misunderstand Vico's metaphor by assuming that one's senses are passive 
receptors of abiding stimuli; to the contrary, seeing is an active engagement 
with one's surroundings, an evolving ability to move within commonplaces 
by exercising common sense. There is no abiding truth to be seen, but 
rather arguments to be taken up by uniting imagination with eloquence . 
Vico argued that one can develop lawyering "sight" through the 
ingenious method of rhetorical instruction. By arguing both sides of a case 
in response to a specific problem by working within the commonplaces, 
students develop the capacity for the sophisticated semiotic activities of 
lawyering. Law professors should conceive legal education as educating 
students about how to make arguments that can never meet the strictures of 
logical thinking, bringing to bear Aristotle's famous distinction between 
rhetoric and dialectic. 47 For example, students must learn to deploy 
metaphors in the course of legal argumentation to find the available lines of 
argument for securing the adherence of their audience. A well-chosen 
metaphor leads the hearer to a conclusion directly, as if she suddenly turned 
her gaze to see something for the first time. In fact, of course, the 
conclusion immediately in front of her eyes is predicated on a complex 
body of tacit semiological knowledge and education that the rhetor draws 
46 . See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 19-30 (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall trans. , 2d rev. ed. , Crossroad Publ 'g 1989) (1960). 
47. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 25-36 [1354a-1355a] 
(George A. Kennedy trans., 2d ed., 2007) . 
2011] Vico, Llewellyn, & the Task of Legal Education 149 
upon artfully and cannot be generated reliably by methodical manipulation. 
Through the practice of using metaphors in the course of a legal education, 
students begin to see the world differently with an aim of being able to lead 
others to see the world differently as well. 
Vico's teaching has gained new traction with the recent focus on 
research into the metaphoric structure of cognition.48 Steven Winter has 
applied this research to the question of legal reasoning and argumentation,49 
arguing that it exrlains how legal reasoning can simultaneously be creative 
and constrained.5 In a related vein, George Taylor extends Paul Ricoeur's 
detailed work on metaphors and suggests that it provides the means to 
address one of the most important questions in legal theory: the role of 
creativity.51 The notion of a metaphor as a way of being-a mode of 
creative existence within the world that in tum gives us our world-literally 
"fleshes out" Vico's insights into the cultivation of creative thinking. These 
contemporary theorists reject the computational approach to reasoning and 
instead locate reasoning in the primary metaphors that develop out of one's 
corporeal existence and then, in tum, generate a complex and dynamic 
"body" of concepts that operate metaphorically.52 These findings do not 
48. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have combined to provide the most compelling 
combination of cognitive studies and philosophy to describe this emerging field of study. See 
generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) ; GEORGE 
LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS 
CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999). 
49. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND (2001). 
50 . Winter provides a succinct summary of this point in a recent article : 
In short, what our examination of these legal metaphors shows is that legal imagination 
and constraint are not opposed qualities they are thought to be, but a single human process . 
Metaphor, in other words, reintegrates us with ourselves. An appreciation of metaphorical 
reason paradoxically (and, from the perspective of Western philosophy, "metaphorical 
thought" is already paradoxical) reconcile s freedom and constraint as mutually constitutive . 
Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, "without roots which it thrusts into the world, it would not 
be freedom at all." 
Steven L. Winter, Re-Embodying Law , 58 MERCER L. REV. 869, 897 (2007) (quoting MAURICE 
MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 456 (Colin Smith trans., 1962)). 
51. George Taylor , Law and Creativity, in ON PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN LAW 81 (Francis 
1. Mootz , III ed., 2009) . 
52. The philosopher , Mark Johnson, explains that the computational mod el of reasoning is 
being eclipsed by new research that reveals how "our conceptualization and reasoning are 
grounded in our bodily experience and shaped primarily by patterns of perception and action ." 
Mark L. Johnson , Mind, Metaphor, Law , 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 846 (2007) . We reason 
according to "image schemas" that arise from our embodied interaction with the environment , and 
therefore have "highly determinate 's patial ' or 'bodily ' logics ." Id. at 855. "Once we have 
primary metaphors " grounded in this embodied logic , 
we are off and running, so to speak. Through various types of blending and composition, we 
develop vast coherent systems of metaphorically defined concepts ... . All of our most 
impressive intellectual achievements- in physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology, 
sociology, mathematics, logic, philosophy , religion, and art- involve irreducible and 
indispensable conceptual metaphors. In other words , all of the key concepts in all of these 
150 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 57 
generate a methodology of creative thinking and argumentation, but they do 
explain how this capacity develops and works. 53 Vico's suggested method 
of education-the cultivation of ingenuity through rhetorical 
argumentation-finds strong support in this contemporary work. 
If there can be no methodology of metaphorical reasoning and legal 
creativity, where does Vico's injunction lead? First, it should be recalled 
that he does suggest an "ingenuous method," by which he means learning 
the topics and engaging in argumentation. This is akin to conditioning 
one's body for sports: one can deliberately fashion a plan to sharpen his 
natural proclivities and skills so as to permit the body to perform in creative 
ways in the heat of competition. In the context of legal education this same 
conditioning is at work. The goal of legal education should not be to 
fashion a rigorous and computational mindset but rather to lead students to 
exercise their creative thinking in ways that permits them to begin 
practicing and accumulating the experience that further cultivates their 
ingenuity. When she begins practicing, a law student who memorizes 
material and takes multiple choice tests is likely to feel as if she has been 
placed at the starting line of a marathon without having so much as jogged 
around the block during the previous three years. 
The Carnegie Report appropriately lauds the Socratic method of 
teaching in the first year of law school for establishing a base upon which 
legal education can build lawyering competence. Many professors have 
embraced the "problem method" in advanced law courses, which builds on 
and extends the first year introduction to legal reasoning. The problem 
disciplines are defined by multiple, often inconsistent, metaphors, and we reason using the 
internal logic of these metaphors. · 
Id. at 864-65. This basis for our thinking explains how we are at once grounded in the world and 
also capable of creatively reshaping our world. 
There is a logic of our bodily experience that is imaginatively appropriated in defining our 
abstract concepts and reasoning with them. Imaginative processes of this sort depend on the 
nature of our bodies, our brains, and the patterns of our interactions with our environment. 
Imagination-w hich is the soul of human thinking-is therefore constrained and orderly, 
even though it can be flexible and creative in response to novel situations. 
Id . at 846. 
53. During a roundtable discussion about the metaphoric basis of legal reasoning , Mark 
Johnson emphasized this point: 
[I]t is very popular to have what I call the miracle theory of creativity. It just happens, and 
there is no explaining it. Some people just do this. But for the most part, what you are doing 
concerns something that Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier have argued extensively in their 
book, The Way We Think, which is about conceptual blending. They show you a number of 
different patterns by which people routinely can create creative conceptual blends. And you 
do make use of these cognitive resources that you have. I want to urge that it is not that you 
can predict when something creative can come about, but it is an appropriation of something 
and seeing how it, or some certain sturctures, can apply to some other domain. 
That is not an explanation of how to be creative, but at least it suggests that it's not a 
miracle . It is not [that] this act is, like Richard Rorty would say, just a radical rupture. 
Johnson , supra note 52, at I 024 . 
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method expands the rhetorical demands on students by moving beyond the 
self-contained world of an appellate opinion and working with multiple 
sources to solve a new problem. In my Sales course,54 I provide text to 
orient and focus the students and one or more judicial opinions to provide 
background. The class session is devoted to a collaborative effort to bring 
the Uniform Commercial Code to bear on written problems assigned in 
advance of the class. The goal of the classroom experience is to model 
effective rhetorical efforts and to prod students to engage in the effort to 
solve a problem without an empirical or logical-deductive answer. In short, 
I strive to create a forum in which legal rhetoric is modeled, practiced, and 
refined. 
Additionally, law professors can rethink the project of legal education 
along the lines of Llewellyn's more concrete proposals. Llewellyn 
recognized the centrality of rhetoric to law and called for a liberal arts 
education in law to equip students with the training necessary to practice 
law successfully. But Llewellyn also was a hard-nosed realist who 
understood the institutional and historical realities of legal practice that 
could not be overcome by rhetorical theories. "A liberal art can be as 
liberal as you please, and it should be-any liberal art should be, including 
law. But one thing, I repeat, sits firm: any man who proposes to practice a 
liberal art must be technically competent. "55 The lawyer must know more 
than dexterity with Socratic dialogue: she must understand the world and 
how it works; she must appreciate the depth and complexity of the 
problems facing individuals and entities that is only later summarized in a 
few pages of the description of the "facts" in an appellate opinion; she must 
appreciate that one of the "law-jobs" identified by Llewellyn is counseling 
one's client, which is different from serving as a legal mouthpiece; she must 
understand the background social mores against which people invoke 
formal legal doctrine, appreciating the meaning of a handshake or the filing 
of a lawsuit beyond their legally cognizable meaning. 
Llewellyn was ahead of his time when arguing that legal education 
should eschew a wholly cognitive approach and instead should embrace a 
skills-oriented upper-class curriculum. 56 Even when discussing the 
54. See FRANCIS J. MOOTZ, III ET AL , COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING: SALES, LEASES AND 
COMPUTER INFORMATION (2d ed. 2008) . 
55. Liberal Art , supra note 36, at 380. 
56. Kate Kruse properly notes that the Legal Realists did not advance a sophisticated approach 
to clinical legal education. Katherine R. Kruse , Getting Real About Legal Realism, New Legal 
Realism and Clinical Legal Education , N .Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) . Nevertheless, 
Llewellyn was far ahead of his time when arguing for skills-based education, even if he rejected 
Jerome Frank 's simplistic "immersion" conception ofa clinical law school for being insufficiently 
theoretical. Id. (text accompanying notes I 06-16) . 
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education that occurs within the four walls of the law school, he insisted on 
the need to develop more realistic teaching materials that deepened the 
superficial world of the ap}?ellate opinion by adding context, background, 
and critical understanding . Legal education should break away from its 
exclusive focus on the conceptual analysis of cases, Llewellyn believed, and 
address more broadly the skills required of practicing lawyers. 
He posits that the first goal of educational reform is to learn what 
lawyers actually do, thereby revealing the capacities that should be 
developed in law school. 58 Recognizing that many lawyers play important 
roles in political and civic life leads Llewellyn to cast the question broadly, 
asking "[f]or Decent politics, what training do our law schools offer?" 59 
Even those who devote their full professional life to practicing law do far 
more than apply settled rules: "Not rules, but doing, is what we seek to train 
men for." 60 After the first year of Socratic dialogue about case law, 
Llewellyn urged that coursework involve detailed examinations of legal 
problems in their full complexity, even at the cost of not covering the ever-
expanding universe of legal doctrine . Class materials should bring together 
rich and diverse materials for assessment and debate, guided by Llewellyn's 
emphatic rule: "better less, with real understanding, than more of the 
ununderstood . .. The upshot seems to be that, within our [three year] time-
limitation, we either integrate the background of social and economic fact 
and policy, course by course, or fail of our job." 6 1 
As with Vico, contemporary scholars have rediscovered Llewellyn's 
57. Llewellyn acknowledged the benefits of the case method in the first year, but insisted that 
upper division courses should involve detailed examinations of legal problems in their full 
complexity, even if it resulted in less doctrin al coverage . He advocated that class materials in 
upper division classes should bring together detailed materials that are rich and diverse, so as to 
provide a context for class discussion, and he was guided by the rule : "better less, with real 
understanding, than more of the ununderstood." So-Called Legal Education, supra note 31, at 
671. 
58. Id. at 653-56. 
59. Id. at 656. 
60. Id. at 654. 
61. Id. at 671. At the end of his career, Llewellyn was sounding the same theme : 
To achieve the values of policy discussion in a modem context, the student needs enough 
information about the particular rule under inquiry so that he can think instead of merely 
palaver or emote. Off-the-cuff, bald of information, is not policy-discussion, it is vaporing .. 
. . This inescapably results in cutting, relentless cutting, of the doctrinal material covered. It 
means highly intensified treatment of a vastly smaller body of rules. Cut down thus on scope 
of the material, and your class-hours do indeed suffice to do the job of technical training, 
they suffice also to enrich it with exploration of meaning, they suffice to go on into the arts 
of policy-evaluation, of imagining curative measures, and of documentary and legislative 
drafting: all merging in the pursuit of a true liberal art. 
Liberal Art, supra note 35, at 385. As Llewellyn wryly reminds us, "I have never heard that 
Socrates was seriously worried over 'coverage in class."' Id. at 387. 
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message and seek to revive this thinking with a "new legal realism."62 The 
original realists focused on a realistic approach to appellate case law, 
showing that the deductive model described in law school classrooms did 
not match with reality. Just as Llewellyn looked beyond case law, scholars 
of new legal realism seek to prepare students for the complex social world 
they will inhabit as legal professionals. 63 These initiatives promise to 
revive Llewellyn's insight into the need for radical reforms of legal 
education. 
The adherents of the new legal realism acknowledge that focusing on 
the "empirical reality" of law and legal practice has the potential to devolve 
into a reductionist empiricism. 64 This is where Llewellyn's legacy can 
prove most helpful. Llewellyn's realism called for the rejection of 
conceptual abstraction and the recovery of "reality," but he recognized that 
the reality of legal practice is a web of interlocking discourses rather than a 
62. The "New Legal Realism" effort began with a conference at the University of Wisconsin 
in 2004 dedicated to extending the "law and society" thesis that legal studies should be grounded 
in empirical reality rather than just conceptual rigor. Stewart Macaulay describes a two-pronged 
research agenda: describing "law in action" (how law really works on the ground) and "living 
law" (social constraints in addition to legal prescription). Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the 
Old Legal Realism : "Things Ain't What They Used to Be", 2005 WISC. L. REV. 365, 385-86. 
63. The Foreword to the Wisconsin symposium provides a detailed description of the need to 
rethink legal education as part of the new legal realism : 
What, then, would a new legal realist approach to teaching look like? Ultimately it 
implies a call for sociolegal scholars to take the everyday practice of law seriously, and for 
legal education to take seriously the fact that lawyers need to be able to systematically 
analyze the real world in which they operate. Legal doctrine as reflected in statutes and case 
law is essential to lawyering and must be at the core of what is taught in law school. But, in 
teaching these materials, there is a tendency to treat law as a closed, logical system; students 
are often essentially taught-if only by implication- to set aside their understanding of the 
real world as they learn to "think like a lawyer." 
A new legal realist approach to legal education would agree that the central focus of 
legal education should be rigorous, analytic thinking, but would broaden what is included in 
the substance of that analysis-not because it is interesting or 'enriching,' but because it is 
core to the practice of law. It would merge theory and practice, teaching students to think 
rigorously and systematically about the problems and situations they will encounter in the 
practice of law. Traditional legal material is necessary but not sufficient for this project. 
Decades of sociolegal scholarship have established that law is a social institution that does 
not operate in a vacuum. Law is an open system, legal rules are not self-enforcing, and 
informal processes often carry the day; thus, to practice law effectively, lawyers combine 
their understanding of the law with their understanding of the real world . 
. . . A new legal realist approach to legal education would take seriously the fact that 
lawyers are continually engaged in what amount to mini research projects; they take in data 
about the world around them, both experientially and from the reports of other people, and 
process those data to come up with ideas about how things work and what consequences flow 
from what actions. 
Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword : Is it Time/or a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 335, 
359-60 . 
64. See Macaulay, supra note 62 , at 395-96; Stewart Macaulay , Contracts, New Legal 
Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1189 
(2006). 
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schema that could be described and then mastered. He was far more 
pragmatic in outlook than many of his fellow realists-who tended to place 
too much faith in the power of sociology, psychology, and economics-and 
he rejected the stereotypical realist view that law should be subsumed into 
the social science departments ofresearch universities. 65 
In short, he favoured a commonsense strategy for research, based on a 
realistic appraisal of the obstacles in the way of quick advance, such as 
the cost, the lack of glamour in much of the work, and the shortage of 
personnel with appropriate training. . . . [His] was a pragmatic and 
sensible approach which could form the basis for a rounded strategy 
for developing the subject, giving due re~ard both to the importance of 
theory and to likely practical difficulties. 6 
But simply accepting a chastened view of empirical studies is insufficient. 
Llewellyn had made this point against some of his fellow realists, but he 
understood that deeper questions were implicated and made a more far-
reaching philosophical point. 
Dennis Patterson suggests that the substance of Llewellyn's 
philosophical views anticipated Wittgenstein's later work: Llewellyn firmly 
believed that philosophy leaves legal practice as it is, but that nevertheless 
there is important work to be done within the practice. 67 
Like Wittgenstein, Llewellyn believed that we can never escape the 
realm of linguistic understanding. What this means for the critique of 
law is that the ground of critique must be internal to legal practice 
itself. The impossibility of transcending the (linguistic) limits of the 
practice and reaching a point outside the practice from which to 
critique it leaves only those within the practice as sources-and 
evaluators--of criticism. 68 • 
It is precisely this philosophical disposition that brought Llewellyn to the 
rhetorical tradition and aligns his work with the message of Vico's oration. 
One must attend to the reality of law and its social setting, and social 
scientific inquiry is a necessary part of this endeavor; however, the "reality" 
of law can never be captured solely by empirical measurement any more 
65. Liberal Art, supra note 35, at 375-94; see Michael Ansaldi , The German Llewellyn, 58 
BROOK. L. REV. 705, 711 (1992). 
66. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 196 {Univ. of 
Oklahoma Press 1985) (1973). In light of the tremendous strides made by the social sciences in 
the intervening years, Twining does ask whether Llewellyn's cautious approach had, by the end of 
his career, become "complacent and unambitious in relation to the possibilities and the needs." Id. 
67. Patterson, supra note 40, at 577-79. 
68. Id. at 599-600. 
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than by logical-deductive analysis. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The instrumental consciousness forged by contemporary legal practice 
will assert itself with a vengeance against this Article: "What is the 
solution?," and even more urgently, "What, exactly, is the problem?" Many 
might argue that "legal education is designed to prepare students to be 
lawyers, not philosophers or rhetoricians." This response demonstrates the 
problem that this Article seeks to engage. 
Legal education must expand its scope not because it answers an 
instrumental need of the practicing bar, but because such an expansion will 
undermine the instrumental ideology that pervades contemporary legal 
practice. An expansion of scope in this respect means only to embrace the 
full complexity of the practices that are reduced to caricatures of formal 
reasoning and deductive logic, which, as many recognize, hold neither 
explanatory nor normative power. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's account of 
how one encounters the world generally rings especially true for the 
experience of participating in legal practice. "The world is not what I think, 
but what I live through. I am open to the world. I have no doubt that I am 
in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible." 69 Law 
professors cannot grasp legal reality and then dispense it to students in 
carefully measured doses. Law is one modality of participating in social 
reality, and that participation is complex and dynamic. Legal education 
should begin to initiate students into this reality with a measure of self-
understanding and self-criticism, rather than half-heartedly acknowledging 
the implausibility of the standard accounts of legal reasoning but then 
reinscribing them every day in the classroom. 
Ironically, by escaping from the narrow and artificial conception of 
legal education fostered by an instrumental view of the law, professors will 
find that this new understanding better serves students in their goal to be 
effective practitioners . Llewellyn's call for legal education as a liberal art is 
similar to an undergraduate liberal arts education. Advocates tout it as being 
intrinsically non-instrumental but then also claim that students are better 
prepared to deal with the world in all its complexities-as a citizen, 
economic agent, and member of society-as a result of their education. 
Vico's rhetorical philosophy and Llewellyn's rhetorical conception of law 
and legal education point the way toward a re-orientation of legal education 
and a re-conceptualization of legal practice that revive elements of ancient 
wisdom while also boldly addressing the needs of contemporary society. 
69 . MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY , PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION , at xvi-xvii (Colin Smith 
trans ., 5th impression 1970) (1962). 
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By following this path , legal education can avoid failing its students. 
